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Recent Decisions
CIVIL RIGHTS - TITLE VII - SEX DISCRIMINATION -
EXCLUSION OF PREGNANCY-RELATED DISABILITIES FROM
BENEFIT ELIGIBILITY UNDER EMPLOYER DISABILITY
PLAN DOES NOT CONSTITUTE SEX DISCRIMINATION VIOL-
ATIVE OF TITLE VII OF 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT. GENERAL
ELECTRIC CO. V. GILBERT, __ U.S. , 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
A substantial portion of America's private industrial concerns
protect their full-time employees against the risk of temporary work
absence from nonoccupational disabilities through some form of
comprehensive income maintenance plan paying weekly benefits.'
Approximately sixty percent of these plans single out a particular
class of disabilities - those pregnancy-related - for explicit
exclusion from coverage. 2 Pregnancy exclusions have catalyzed
recent litigation on the issue of whether a private employer's lone
exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from an otherwise
comprehensive nonoccupational disability income maintenance plan
is sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.
3
Title VII makes unlawful discrimination by an employer with
respect to the hiring, discharge, compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment on the basis of sex.4 The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter EEOC), charged by
Congress with interpreting Title VII,5 issued a guideline in 1972
requiring employers to treat pregnancy-related disabilities "on the
same terms and conditions" as all other temporary disabilities.6 In
1975, five United States Courts of Appeals held that Title VII was
1. Forty percent of the companies in the United States provide temporary disability
income maintenance coverage for their workers. Arguments Before the Court,
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 45 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1976) (argument of
G.E.'s attorney).
2. Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) (orginally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253, as amended by Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, Pub, L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103).
4. Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added).
5. Id. § 2000e-12(a).
6. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975).
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violated by the disparate treatment of pregnancy-related disabilities
in disability income maintenance plans.
7
On December 7, 1976, however, the United States Supreme Court
led a successful and surprise attack on these decisions. In General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert,8 the Supreme Court, by a six-to-three margin, 9
in effect overruled these five courts of appeals' decisions. The Gilbert
majority held that disparate treatment of pregnancy is not in itself
discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII. For many female
workers, December 7, 1976 will live on in infamy.
II. THE GILBERT SETTING
The General Electric Company (hereinafter G.E.) is a large
industrial corporation operating production plants throughout the
United States. As a fringe benefit for its employees, G.E. maintains
a comprehensive nonoccupational sickness and accident benefit
plan. 10 Under this plan, an employee who incurs a nonjob-related
disability which renders him or her unable to work may be eligible
for weekly income maintenance payments. 1 If the claim is
approved, the employee begins to receive payments on the eighth
day of work absence, unless he or she is hospitalized before that
time, in which case payments commence immediately. The amount
of a weekly payment is equivalent to sixty percent of the worker's
regular weekly wage, with a maximum disability payment of $150
per week. If necessary, payments are made through twenty-six weeks
of absence.
1 2
Coverage is comprehensive; unless a disability is expressly
excluded, it is covered.' 3 The G.E. plan involves three distinct
7. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct.
806 (1977); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 731 (1977); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 519 F.2d 661 (4th
Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976), reh. denied, 97 S. Ct. 731 (1977);
Communications Workers of America v. A.T.&T. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.
1975), vacated, 97 S. Ct. 724 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d
199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on juris. grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
8. 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
9. In the majority were the Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist (author of the
opinion), Stewart, White, Blackmun and Powell. Justice Brennan authored a
dissent in which Justice Marshall joined. Justice Stevens wrote a separate
dissent.
10. This information was brought out originally in the opinion of the district court,
Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 370-71 (E.D. Va. 1974). In the
sense that G.E. was primarily responsible for benefit payments to its employees,




[A] comprehensive insurance policy is one coverinig all exposures, as in
the case of a comprehensive automobile liability policy; all perils, as in
the case of the comprehensive automobile material damage policy; or all
hazards, as in the case of the comprehensive general liability policy -
each subject to exclusions. Thus, in a comprehensive policy, "If it ain't
excluded, it's covered."
R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 168-69 (5th ed. 1972).
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categories of disability.1 4 The unisex category includes those
disabilities mutually incurrable by both sexes.
1 5 Several of these
unisex disabilities are incurrable through the voluntary or reckless
action of an individual - attempted suicide, alcoholism, drug
addiction, and elective cosmetic surgery, to name only a few.'
6 The
male-dominated category encompasses those disabilities saddled
exclusively or predominantly on men, such as hair transplants,
prostatectomies, and vasectomies.1
7 The female-dominated category
comprehends disabilities exclusively or predominantly inflicting
women, such as breast cancer, hysterectomies, and salpingectom-
ies.' 8 The most notable female disability of all - pregnancy - is,
however, expressly excluded from coverage. It isthe only exclusion,
and a broad one at that. Any disability, whether pregnancy-related
or not, which is incurred by a woman while on a maternity leave
fails to trigger benefit eligibility.'
9
Two of the Gilbert plaintiffs suffered particularly as a result of
the refusal of their employer to pay disability benefits for pregnancy.
Doris Wiley had an unplanned pregnancy and eventually took a
maternity leave. She was legally separated from her husband and
had a two-year old daughter to support. Denied disability benefits
from G.E., she applied for welfare, but had to wait the usually
inconvenient period before commencement of payments. In the
meantime, with no other means of support, she ran out of the money
necessary to pay her bills. Her utilities were shut off and she and her
baby subsisted for the two months of her disability without heat,
electric light, cooking, and refrigeration.
20 Emma Furch was
hospitalized two days after beginning her maternity leave. Seven
-days later, she delivered a stillborn baby. Within a week, while
recuperating at home, she developed a nonpregnancy-related blood
14. This categorization was suggested by Justice Brennan in his Gilbert dissent, 97
S. Ct. at 417-18. The majority. seems to implicitly utilize the same tripartite
division, id. at 408: "But we have here no question of excluding a disease or
disability comparable in all other respects to covered diseases or disabilities and
yet confined to the members of one . . . sex." (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 417. A unisex disability incurred by a woman during a maternity leave is
not covered, even when unrelated to pregnancy. See text accompanying note 21
infra.
16. The district court indicated that G.E. had paid disability benefits for employee
work absence from sclerosis of the liver, lung cancer, emphysema, injury
sustained in auto accident, injury incurred in sport activity, injury incurred in a
fight, disability following a program for the cure of alcoholism and drug
addiction, injury incurred in an attempted suicide, disability from elective plastic
surgery and disability following a program of psychiatric treatment. G.E. pays
benefits for these disabilities regardless of the degree of care taken by the
employee to avoid them. 375 F. Supp. at 374.
17. 97 S. Ct. at 417 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 417-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A salpingectomy involves the removal 
of
one or both of a woman's fallopian tubes, so that she will be unable to become
pregnant. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1249 (23d ed. 1976).
19. See text accompanying notes 20-21 infra.
20. 375 F. Supp. at 381 n.12; Post-trial Brief for Plaintiffs at 13-14.
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clot in one of her lungs, requiring hospitalization. Because her
benefit eligibility had been severed by the maternity leave, no
weekly benefits accrued to her for work absence from the blood clot
and, of course, none from the miscarriage.
21
The plaintiffs failed to obtain any change of policy from G.E.,
22
exhausted their administrative remedies, 23 and filed a class action
suit against G.E., charging the corporation with an illegal employ-
ment practice in violation of Title VII as interpreted by the 1972
EEOC guideline explicitly requiring employers to treat pregnancy-
related disabilities like all other temporary disabilities. 24 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that
G.E.'s pregnancy exclusion was discriminatory in a "deliberate and
intentional" 25 manner and ordered that the plaintiffs receive denied
benefits. 26 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in a two-to-
one decision. 27 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed by a
six-to-three margin.
28
A complete analytical understanding of Gilbert can best be
gained through an item by item examination of the considerations
faced and dealt with by the Court in its decision. The G.E.
pregnancy exclusion could have been proven illegally discriminatory
in three ways - by a showing of (1) per se (facial) discrimination, (2)
discriminatory motive, or (3) discriminatory effect.29 The majority
found that discrimination on the basis of sex was not proven under
any of these standards. In separate dissenting opinions, Justices
Brennan 30 and Stevens argued that sex discrimination was proven
by the plaintiffs under all three standards. The Court also had to
decide whether or not to defer to the 1972 EEOC pregnancy
21. 97 S. Ct. at 405 n.4, 416 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. The plaintiffs' labor union, the International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, AFL-CIO and CLC, sought the deletion of the pregnancy
exclusion five times in previous national negotiations with G.E. - in 1955, 1963,
1966, 1969, and 1973. Each time, G.E. refused to delete the exclusion. 375 F. Supp.
at 371; Arguments Before the Court, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 44 U.S.L.W.
3421, 3423 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1976) (argument of Ruth Weyand, for plaintiffs). As was
pointed out by the district court, however, "'The rights assured by Title VII are
not rights which can be bargained away - either by a union, by an employer, or
by both acting in'concert.'" 375 F. Supp. at 382 (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1971)). Thus, the fact that the pregnancy
exclusion was part of a collectively bargained agreement was not an issue in
Gilbert.
23. 97 S. Ct. at 404-5.
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975).
25. 375 F. Supp. at 386.
26. Id.
27. 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975).
28. 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976), reh. denied, 97 S. Ct. 731 (1977).
29. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973); Griggs v: Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). See also cases
cited by Justice Brennan, 97 S. Ct. at 417 n.7.
30. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan's dissent.
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guideline,3 1 for if it decided to defer, the G.E. pregnancy exclusion
would be a "prima facie violation of Title VII. ' 32 If the Court decided
not to defer, an independent examination would be necessary. Since
the majority chose not to defer,33 and made an independent
examination of the G.E. plan, this article will concentrate solely
upon the Gilbert Court's approach to the three modes of evidencing
sex discrimination under Title VII.
III. PER SE DISCRIMINATION
On its face, was the G.E. plan's pregnancy exclusion gender-
neutral or inextricably sex-based? This was the issue facing the
Court at the first stage of its' analysis. The majority in Gilbert
contended that it was not the sex of female G.E. employees, but
rather the physical condition of pregnancy, which was the basis of
the pregnancy exclusion. 34 This conclusion in Gilbert was presaged
31. "Disabilities caused by or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary
disabilities and should be treated ... under any temporary disability insurance
. .. plan ... on the same terms and conditions as ... other temporary
disabilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975).
32. Id. § 1604.10(a).
33. 97 S. Ct. at 411. The Court did not have to defer to the EEOC pregnancy
guideline, since administrative guidelines, unlike congressionally authorized
regulations, do not possess the independent force of law. Id. Normally, however,
an EEOC guideline is entitled to considerable persuasive power - "'great
deference."' Id. at 410 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34
(1971)).
Three reasons for its decision not to defer to the pregnancy guideline were
provided by the Gilbert majority. The EEOC pregnancy guideline expressed a
position contrary to past EEOC General Counsel Opinion Letters, see, e.g.,
General Counsel Opinion Letter, CCH EPG 17,304.43 (1966), and an EEOC case
decision expressly approving the letters, EEOC Decision No. 70-360, CCH EEOC
DECISIONS 6084 (Dec. 16, 1969). Contra, EEOC Decision No. 71-1474, CCH
EEOC DECISIONS 6221 (Mar. 19, 1971). Moreover, the 1972 guideline was
promulgated eight years after Title VII's enactment. 97 S. Ct. at 411. In the
majority's opinion, this lack of both consistency and contemporaneity weakened
the guideline's persuasiveness as the correct interpretation of the legislative
intent behind Title VII. Id. See generally Leis, Current Trends in Pregnancy
Benefits - 1972 EEOC Guidelines Interpreted, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 127 (1974)
(also discussing other faults in the promulgation of the guideline).
Aiming at the heart of the guideline itself, the majority summarized a
colloquy between Senators Randolph and Humphrey during Senate debate on
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, in which the latter acknowledged, in his role as floor
leader, that it was intended in Title VII that "differences in treatment in
industrial benefit plans, including earlier retirement options for women, may
continue in operation." 110 CONG. REc. 13663-664 (1964), quoted in 97 S. Ct. at
412. Senator Humphrey's statement, in conjunction with an interpretive
guideline by the Wage and Hour Administrator pursuant to the Equal Pay Act
and the Bennett Amendment of Title VII directly contradicting the EEOC
guideline, further weakened the EEOC guideline's persuasiveness for the
majority. Id. But see 97 S. Ct. at 418-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting) and cases cited
at note 7 supra. See generally Comment, Waiting for the Other Shoe - Wetzel
and Gilbert in the Supreme Court, 25 EMORY L.J. 125, 127-43 (1976).
34. 97 S. Ct. at 408.
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in the Court's 1974 decision in Geduldig v. Aiello, 35 in which a six-to-
three majority 36 held that the exclusion of pregnancy-related
disabilities from an otherwise comprehensive California social
welfare program providing nonoccupational income maintenance
benefits was not in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. A footnote discussion in Geduldig was found
directly applicable by the Gilbert majority:
37
The [pregnancy exclusion] does not exclude anyone from
benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one
physical condition - pregnancy - from the list of
compensable disabilities. While it is true that only women
can become pregnant, it does not follow that every ...
classification concerning pregnancy is a sex based classifi-
cation .... [P]regnancy is an objectively identifiable
physical condition with unique characteristics....
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and
gender as such under this insurance program becomes clear
upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides
potential recipients into two groups - pregnant women and
nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively
female, the second includes members of both sexes. The
fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to
members of both sexes.
38
Applying this rationale from Geduldig, the Gilbert majority
concluded that "an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability benefits
plan providing general coverage is not a gender-based discrimina-
tion at all."
'39
The majority in Gilbert, relying on the Geduldig reasoning,
bifurcated the class of all women into pregnant women and
nonpregnant women.40 The G.E. plan did not discriminate against
35. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Geduldig was decided after the district court rendered its
opinion in Gilbert. The Gilbert litigation, therefore, first dealt with Geduldig on
appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which found Geduldig
inapplicable and held in favor of the female employees, thereby affirming the
district court's opinion. 519 F.2d 661, 666-67 (4th Cir. 1975).
36. In the majority were the Chief Justice, Justice Stewart (author of the opinion),
and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist (author of the Gilbert
majority opinion). The dissent was written by Justice Brennan, with Justices
Douglas and Marshall concurring.
37. 97 S. Ct. at 407.
38. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) (emphasis added), quoted in
97 S. Ct. at 407.
39. Id. at 408. In other words, the pregnancy exclusion was not discriminatory per
se.
40. Id. at 407. Although Gilbert and Geduldig explicitly divide potential recipients
into pregnant women and nonpregnant persons, the class of nonpregnant
persons should be divided further into nonpregnant women and nonpregnant
men. Men cannot become pregnant and thus are not included in our analysis of
the per se status of the pregnancy exclusion as it relates to those who can become
pregnant - women. It does not do violence to the majority's nonpregnant
persons category to divide it, therefore, into nonpregnant women and men.
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the class of all female G.E. employees, but rather, discriminated
against the class of pregnant, female G.E. employees. Title VII
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex.4 Since the ground of
G.E.'s discrimination was not womanhood, but pregnancy, the plan
did not violate Title VII. For the Gilbert majority, then, discrimina-
tion against pregnancy is not discrimination on the basis of sex.
The correctness of this approach depends on the validity of the
majority's bifurcation of pregnant and nonpregnant women in the
context of G.E.'s insurance plan. It was at this point that Justice
Stevens, in his dissent, launched his attack upon the majority's
reasoning. The G.E. plan, like all insurance plans,42 protects
insureds against the risk of loss from the occurrence of specified
events. The word "risk" denotes uncertainty concerning loss in the
future. 43 As Justice Stevens accurately explained, "Insurance
programs, company policies, and employment contracts all deal with
future risks rather than historic facts. The classification is between
persons who face a risk of pregnancy and those who do not." 44 Thus,
the G.E. plan insured employees against temporary loss of income
from disabilities incurrable in the future, not against disabilities
already incurred. Once a woman becomes pregnant, any discussion
of risk becomes superfluous, for the risk no longer exists, the
disability does. Because virtually all female G.E. employees were
susceptible to the risk of pregnancy, the majority's bifurcation of
pregnant and nonpregnant women was invalid. In reality, discrimi-
nation against pregnancy is equivalent to discrimination against
the risk of pregnancy. As Justice Stevens aptly pointed out, "[lilt is
the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the
female from the male." 45 Therefore, discrimination against the risk
of pregnancy is equivalent to discrimination against persons on the
basis of womanhood - on the basis of sex.
The Gilbert majority nevertheless depended upon that chimeri-
cal bifurcation. "Perhaps the admonition of Professor Thomas Reed
Powell to his law students is apt; 'If you can think of something
which is inextricably related to some other thing and not think of
the other thing, you have a legal mind.' "46 In the future, any income
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
42. R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 18 (5th ed. 1972).
43. Id. at 19. Mehr and Cammack, in defining "loss," caution that "[loss is an
unintentional decline in, or disappearance of, value arising from a contingency.
The adjective 'unintentional' is an essential part of the definition." Id. at 23
(emphasis added). The majority in Gilbert claimed that one of the legitimate
grounds for G.E.'s decision to exclude pregnancy from coverage was the
voluntariness of the incurrence of pregnancy In most cases. 97 S. Ct. at 408.
Justice Brennan retorted in his dissent that the unintentionality of the
incurrance of a disability was not essential to G.E.'s pattern of coverage. Id. at
415. See text accompanying notes 74-80 infra.
44. 97 S. Ct. at 421 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1157 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd,
511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on juris. grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
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maintenance plan exclusion of a physical disability unique to a
protected class of persons, whether it be pregnancy or, as Justice
Brennan suggests in his dissent, sickle-cell anemia, 47 will not be
considered facially discriminatory under Title VII if the Gilbert
reasoning is followed. Substituting "sickle-cell anemia" for "preg-
nancy," "blacks" for "women," and "race" for "sex" in the Geduldig
language quoted above, 48 the majority's argument reveals itself as
pure sophistry:
The sickle-cell anemia exclusion does not exclude anyone
from benefit eligibility because of race but merely removes
one physical condition - sickle-cell anemia - from the list
of compensable disabilities. While it is true that only blacks
can get sickle-cell anemia, it does not follow that every
classification concerning the disability is a racially based
classification. Sickle-cell anemia is an objectively identifia-
ble physical condition with unique characteristics. The lack
of identity between the excluded disability and race becomes
clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides
potential recipients into two groups - sickle-cell anemic
blacks and nonsickle-cell anemic persons. While the first
group is exclusively black, the second includes members of
all races. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the plan thus
accrue to members of all races.
In other words, under Gilbert there is no discrimination on the basis
of sex in a pregnancy exclusion and, likewise, there would be no
discrimination on the basis of race in a sickle-cell anemia exclusion.
In both cases, the discrimination is directed against a physical
condition only, not against the class of individuals exclusively
subject to that physical condition. In effect, the Supreme Court has
47. 97 S. Ct. at 416 n.5. Sickle-cell anemia is a genetic disease to which, almost
exclusively, those of black African descent are susceptible. Although seven to
nine percent of the American black population carries the sickle-cell trait, about
0.3 percent suffer from the disease. The disease has been found in rare instances
in persons of Mediterranean and Oriental descent. The disease causes normal red
blood cells, which are round in shape, to become crescent-shaped or sickle-
shaped, indicating the breakdown of blood. The blood hemoglobin, which carries
oxygen to the body, becomes abnormal, giving rise to symptoms, such as
degenerative bone disease, leg ulcers, arthritis, acute attacks of pain, yellowing
or greening of the eyes, and extreme tiredness. Note, Constitutional and
Practical Considerations in Mandatory Sickle Cell Anemia Testing, 7 U.C.D. L.
REV. 509, 519 (1974); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 70 (23d ed. 1976). The
disease can, at different times and with varying degrees of severity, render an
inflicted individual unable to work at most types of employment requiring
physical movement. See Smith v. Olin Chemical Corp., 535 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.
1976) (black manual laborer fired as a result of his failure to pass Olin's physical
examination, which had uncovered degenerative bone disease in Smith's spine,
the cause of which Smith and his personal physician claimed was sickle-cell
anemia; race discrimination claimed).
48. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
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defined discrimination in such a way as to render logically
impossible a finding of sex - or race - discrimination on the face of
an income maintenance plan excluding coverage of a disability
unique to one sex - or one race.
It is certainly hard to believe that the Court would be willing to
apply the Gilbert rationale to a sickle-cell'anemia exclusion. If it
failed to do so, then it would plunge into inconsistency. Three
alternatives would be open to the Court: (1) apply the Gilbert
definition of per se coverage discrimination to a sickle-cell anemia
exclusion; (2) reverse Gilbert; or (3) apply the Gilbert per se analysis,
but find discriminatory motive or discriminatory effect.
Considering the definition of per se discrimination in disability
benefit programs from Geduldig v. Aiello,49 one may wonder why
Gilbert is significant. There were three major differences between the
factual situations facing the Court in Gilbert and in Geduldig. While
Gilbert dealt with a private employer's plan, Geduldig concerned a
California social welfare program providing the same kind of
benefits.50 Moreover, the insurance plan in Gilbert was funded by
G.E., but the California program in, Geduldig was funded through
the contributions of public and private employees on a percentage of
salary basis.51 Finally, there was a significant difference between
the extent of the pregnancy exclusion in the programs. In Geduldig,
only normal pregnancies were subject to the exclusion. Disabilities
from complications arising from pregnancy and disabilities incurred
during a maternity leave which were not pregnancy-related were
covered by the California plan.5 2 In Gilbert, however, any disability
which arose during a maternity leave, whether or not pregnancy-
related, was excluded.5 3 Whereas the Geduldig exclusion was a true
-pregnancy exclusion, the Gilbert exclusion was more akin to a
maternity leave exclusion.
The source of the law applicable to both cases was different.
Geduldig was decided entirely on the basis of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 4 Gilbert was ruled by Title VII.
A different standard of judicial scrutiny applies to actions brought
49. Id.
50. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 487-88 (1974).
51. Under the California program, each employee contributed one percent of his or
her salary up to a maximum of $85 per year. Id.
52. Id. at 491. The California statute was interpreted by the California Court of
Appeals as excluding only normal pregnancies. Rentzer v. Unemployment Ins.
Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1973). Eighty percent of all
pregnancies are normal. See text accompanying note 70 infra. There were three
specific exclusions other than normal pregnancy - alcoholism, drug addiction,
and sexual psychopathy. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 488 (1974).
53. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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under each source of law. 55 In Gilbert, had discriminatory effect been
shown, G.E.'s only available, relevant defense would have been one
55. The Supreme Court has at its disposal three separate standards for equal
protection analysis -- minimal scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and strict
scrutiny. These tests are applied only after a classification is found to be
discriminatory. The. three tests require of the discriminator three different
degrees of justification for the discriminatory classification. If the discriminator
can justify its classification under the applicable standard, the discrimination is
not violative of the Constitution. The standard that applies depends on that
which is discriminated against.
The minimal scrutiny test, which is generally applied to state economic,
business, and social welfare laws, will uphold a state classification which bears a
mere rational relationship to a legitimate state interest and is not motivated
invidiously. It is not necessary, under this lower-tier rational basis test, for a
state to "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the
problem at all." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970); Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,
494-96 (1974).
The intermediate- scrutiny test has been applied by the Supreme Court to
most sex discrimination cases. This middle-tier test requires that the sex-based
classification bear a fair and substantial relationship to important governmental
objectives. Craig v. Boren, 97 S..Ct. 451 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975); Weinberger v,. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (fifth amendment);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (fifth amendment); Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971). Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion in Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct.
at 467, argued that minimal scrutiny should be applied to cases of discrimination
against men because they have not been subjected historically to purposeful
unequal treatment to their detriment.
Finally, a classification analyzed under the strict scrutiny test will be upheld
only where the state can demonstrate a compelling state interest. This test
applies to suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin. A
suspect class has been defined by the Supreme Court as one whose members
have been "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the . ..political
process." San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). See
generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the
Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945, 978-83 (1975).- The same--analy s-i is appri&o -cases-under the fourteenth amendment due
process clause when a fundamental right is involved. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (abortion decision during first trimester of pregnancy within
fundamental right to privacy of fourteenth amendment; state's interest in
maternal health and fetal life becomes compelling at, respectively, the second and
the third trimesters). This analysis is also used when a fundamental right is
treated in a discriminatory fashion. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (equal protection of fundamental right to interstate travel violated).
Finally, the Court has recognized that the fifth amendment due process clause
has inherent in it an equal protection guarantee, which can be applied to actions
by the federal government. E.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
Justice Marshall has, in several cases, expressed dissatisfaction "with the
Court's rigidified approach to equal protection analysis." San Antonio Ind.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). He
argues, instead, for the use of a sliding scale approach "with which the Court
will scrutinize particular classifications, depending. . .on the constitutional and
societal importance of the interest adversely affected." Id. at 124-25. See Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441- (1973); Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508-9, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
The standard of scrutiny applicable to a Title VII case, once discriminatory
effect has been shown, is, in essence, that of strict scrutiny. The employer's only
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of "business necessity," 56  which would have required G.E. to
demonstrate that the pregnancy exclusion was necessary to the safe
and efficient operation of the business. 57 In contrast, a mere
rationally supportable, legitimate interest in maintaining the
California program's self-supportiveness, the same employee contri-
bution rate, and identical coverage .was sufficient to sustain the
pregnancy exclusion in Geduldig.
58
These distinctions between Gilbert-type Title VII cases and the
Geduldig case were significant enough to lead-several-lower federal
courts to consider Geduldig inapposite in Title VII cases. 59 Their
view limited Geduldig's reach to state social" welfare programs
scrutinized under the equal protection clause.60 To the Supreme
Court, however, these differences did not affect the ,authority of
Geduldig. It was the opinion of the "Gilbert majority that the
Geduldig concept of per se discrimination was equally applicable in
defenses are that the discriminatory classification is a bona fide occupational
qualification (B.F.O.Q.), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (not applicable to race), or one of
business necessity, id. § 2000-5(g); see Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d
791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). Both defenses are usually
difficult to prove, as is, in equal protection or due process cases, a compelling
state interest. Sex, however, is not yet a suspect class under equal protection
analysis. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), four members of the
Court - the most ever - held sex to be a suspect class. Sex is a suspect class in
California. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1971).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The B.F.O.Q. exception would not have been relevant in
Gilbert. The B.F.O.Q. defense requires a showing that a gender-based classifica-
tion has a manifest relationship to the primary function of the job in question, a
necessity that a particular sex perform the particular job, such as when a female
is needed for a female role in a movie. See generally Oldham, Questions of
Exclusion and Exception Under Title VII - "Sex-Plus"-and the BFOQ, 23 HAST.
L.J. 55, 90 (1971).
57. The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business
purpose such that the practice. is necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of the business. Thus, the business .purpose must be
sufficiently compelling to override any, [discriminatory] impact; the
challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is
alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative
policies or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose
advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential
[discriminatory] impact.
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971) (race discrimination). The business necessity defense is
applicable only when the discrimination arises from a policy facially neutral and
nondiscriminatory in its intent. Id. at 797. "While considerations of economy and
efficiency will often be relevant to, determining the existence of business
necessity, dollar cost alone is not determinative." Id. at 799 n.8.
58. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (1974).
59. See cases cited in note 60 infra. Although the 1972 amendments to Title VII, see
note 3 supra, extended the Act's coverage to the states, the Geduldig majority did
not discuss the Act, nor the 1972 EEOC pregnancy guideline. Justice Brennan's
dissent in that case discussed both and applied them. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484, 501-2, 504 n.9 (1974).
60. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850, 852-54 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97
S. Ct. 806 (1977); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961, 963-64
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 731 (1977); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
519 F.2d 661, 666-67 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976), reh. denied, 97 S.
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Title VII cases, nbtwithstanding that the conduct of a private
employer rather than a state was involved.
61
IV. DISCRIMINATORY MOTIVE
The Gilbert majority recognized that its finding of no per se
discrimination was only the first step in its analysis of G.E.'s
pregnancy exclusion under Title VII standards. If the plaintiffs
proved that G.E.'S exclusion of pregnancy was a mere pretext
designed to effect an invidious discrimination against women, then
a violation of Title.VII's ban on discrimination on the basis of-sex
would be established.62 The majority chose not to infer that lurking
behind G.E.'s pregnancy exclusion was an intent to discriminate
against women as such. For G.E., there was "no question of
excluding a disease or disability comparable in all other respects to
covered diseases or disabilities and yet confined to the members of
one... sex."63 The majority, claiming to rely upon the findings of
the district court,64 explained that pregnancy was distinguishable
from all covered male-female-dominated disabilities in two respects
- "it is not a 'disease' at all,"'65 and it "is often a voluntarily
undertaken and desired condition." 66 According to the majority's
view, the nondisease-voluntariness criteria did not require the
exclusion from coverage of any other male-female-dominated
disability. The majority inferred that G.E. was guided by these twin
criteria, that the company had good reason to believe these criteria
valid, and that,. therefore, G.E. was motivated only by neutral
actuarial considerations in choosing to exclude pregnancy-related
disabilities from income maintenance coverage.6
7
Justice Brennan's dissent convincingly refuted the majority's
wooden reasoning- by reviewing more closely and accurately the
findings of the district court.68 Actually, the district court found that
"[p]regnancy, per se, is not a disease, ' 69 but that labor and delivery
Ct. 731 (1977); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1097-99 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976); Communications Workers of America v. A.T.&T. Co.,
513 F.2d 1024, 1028-31 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated, 97 S. Ct. 724 (1977): Wetzel v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on juris.
grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
61. 97 S. Ct. at 408.
62. Id. at 407-8 (following Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974)).
63. Id. at 408 (emphasis added).
64. 375 F. Supp. at 37.6-77.
65. 97 S. Ct. at 408.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 416.
69. 375 F. Supp. at 375-77. Four commonly accepted definitions of disease presented
to the district court were:
(1) . . . a statistical deviation from the average. The difficulty with this
definition lies in defining what is "average" or "normal."
(2) ... in terms of difficulty in ability to function. The weakness in this
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are disabling in a normal, uncomplicated pregnancy. 70 In addition,
twenty percent of all pregnancies are complicated either by
miscarriage,71 pregnancy-related diseases72 or nonpregnancy-related
diseases, 73 each of which can be disabling.
74
The district court found, with regard to G.E.'s contention that
pregnancy, unlike other disabilities, was voluntary or planned, that
[alt best, . . . with proper care, forbearance, and precaution,
pregnancy can to a large extent be avoided. But "voluntari-
ness" in this sense is meaningless. This standard is not
applied to informal athletic injuries, most of which could
also be avoided by appropriate preparation, forbearance,
and circumspect precaution. The most that can be said with
certainty is that some pregnancies, perhaps a majority, are
voluntary; others are not.75
The coverage of the plan designed by G.E. itself was inconsist-
ent with the nondisease-voluntariness criteria. Take, for example,
G.E.'s coverage of hair transplants. 76 By far, men-predominate over
women in needing and seeking transplantation of hair.77 Baldness is
generally not the result of disease, but rather, the objectification of
the genetic code. Although, as most bald men would agree, loss of
hair is not a voluntarily incurred condition, neither is it disabling.
Since baldness is not disabling, it is not the condition to which the
voluntariness test should be applied, but that which causes a
disability to occur -the hair transplantation itself - is. That
procedure is surely voluntary and can be temporarily disabling. The
conclusion is inescapable that, if in fact G.E. applied the nondisease-
voluntariness criteria, it did so inconsistently. 78
The majority's limitation of the twin criteria to the male-female-
dominated disability categories 79 was novel, as G.E. had not argued
denition is defining "function" in a non-relative social or medical
sense.
(3) . . * a condition, which if not corrected, may.lead to disability or
death. In this connection the medical term "morbidity" is applied, said
term meaning a process of deterioration leading to death.
(4) . . . [the lack of] total physical, psychological well-being.
Id.
70. Id. at 376-77.
71. Approximately ten percent of pregnancies end in miscarriage, predominantly
during the first trimester. In most cases disability lasts for a few days. Id.
72. There are two types of pregnancy-related diseases. The first type is caused by
weight gain from pregnancy. This weight gain may exaggerate underlying,
dormant conditions, such as hypertension and diabetes The other type is caused
by detachment or mislocation of the placenta. Each type can be disabling, but
only half of each require hospitalization. Id.
73. For example, Emma Furch developed a blood clot in one of her lungs, which was
not caused by her pregnancy. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
74. 375 F. Supp. at 376.
75. Id. at 375.
76. A hair transplant is a type of elective plastic surgery:
77. Baldness is a sex-linked and sex-influenced trait. Over ninety-nine percent of
genetically caused bald persons are men.
78. See 97 S. Ct. at 415-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. See notes 17-18 supra, and accompanying text.
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that limitation before the district court. The company had argued
that the twin criteria applied to all disabilities.80 Applied to all three
disability categories, the twin criteria were surely incompetent to
describe the pattern of coverage and exclusion, since the plan
covered such disabilities as "sports injuries, attempted suicides, ...
disabilities incurred in the commission of a crime or during a fight,
and elective cosmetic surgery."8 "
The nondisease-voluntariness criteria possess usefulness for the
majority beyond the facts of Gilbert. Although the majority's
concept of per se discrimination would require that a sickle-cell
anemia exclusion be held to be racially neutral,8 2 the majority could
distinguish a sickle-cell anemia exclusion from a pregnancy
exclusion and, at the same time, avoid the per se analysis altogether.
Faced with a sickle-cell anemia exclusion, the majority could simply
point out that, unlike pregnancy, sickle-cell anemia is both a disease
and involuntary.8 3 In this way, the majority could argue, the sickle-
cell anemia exclusion is a mere subterfuge cloaking a discriminatory
motive. Thus, by applying an error whose magnitude approaches
Brobdingnagian proportions, the majority could shield blacks with
Title VII's protective umbrella but leave women out in the rain.
Justice Brennan, relying on past discriminatory employment
practices by G.E. with regard to women,8 4 went on to show that
G.E.'s reliance on the twin criteria of exclusion, if indeed there was
such reliance, was not an honest and innocent error. "[C]ontempor-
ary disability programs are not creatures of a social or cultural
vacuum devoid of stereotypes and signals concerning the pregnant
woman employee."85 In the 1930's and 1940's, G.E. began for the
first time to include women in its benefit programs.8 6 Prior to the
Equal Pay Act,8 7 G.E. took "pregnancy and other factors into
account in order to scale a woman's wages at 2/3 the level of men's.8 8
Probably as a tactical move, G.E. dropped its forced maternity leave
policy at about the same time the Gilbert plaintiffs filed suit against
the company.8 9 This policy had required pregnant women to leave
work at a point midway into their pregnancy, without pay or income
maintenance payments, even when they were quite capable of
carrying a normal workload. 90 Justice Brennan concluded that G.E.
had not "actually conceptualized or developed [its] comprehensive
80. 375 F. Supp. at 378.
81. 97 S. Ct. at 416 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. See note 48 supra, and accompanying text.
83. See note 47 supra.
84. 97 S. Ct. at 415 n.1.
85. Id. at 420.
86. Id. at 415 n.1.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).





insurance programs disability-by-disability in a strictly sex-neutral
fashion." 91 Rather, G.E.'s pattern of coverage and exclusion
betrayed "a sex-conscious process expressive of the secondary status
of women in the company's labor force."
92
V. DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT
The majority opinion and the dissenting opinions of Justices
Brennan and Stevens agreed that a violation of Title VII could be
established by demonstrating that G.E.'s pregnancy exclusion had a
discriminatory effect upon G.E.'s female employees. 93 There were
two interrelated levels of effect analysis open for consideration by
the justices. One level dealt with the plan's coverage itself and the
other was concerned with the relationship between that coverage
and the employment opportunities of female employees at G.E. and
in the American work force in general.
The majority concentrated solely on the plan's coverage itself.
It's approach was thus strikingly similar to that upon which it relied
in its analysis of per se discrimination, where the majority held that
the G.E. pregnancy exclusion was not facially discriminatory.
94
There was no discriminatory effect against females in G.E.'s
pregnancy exclusion, the majority argued, because the plan provided
equality of coverage in its aggregate risk protection, in the sense
that there was an "evenhanded inclusion of risks." 95 Pregnancy,
according to the majority, was "an additional risk, unique to
women." 96 In other words,
"'[tihere is no risk from which men are protected and
women are not . . . [and] no risk from which women are
protected and men are not.' "97
Pregnancy was a risk which, if covered, would have protected
women but not men, and it was therefore an additional risk.
The majority erred, as far as the dissenters were concerned.
True, there was an evenhanded inclusion of risks, but only in the
unisex disability category - those disabilities that "mutually inflict
both sexes."9 8 Pregnancy was an additional risk unique to women
only in the sense that it was a disability in the female-dominated
disability category. In the same sense were male-dominated
disabilities additional risks unique to men. Outside of the unisex
category, there were risks from which men were protected and
91. Id. at 420.
92. Id. at 416.
93. Id. at 417.
94. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
95. 97 S. Ct. at 410.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 409 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)).
98. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
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women were not, and visa versa. For example, as Justice Stevens
explained, "[I]f the word 'risk' is used narrowly, men are protected
against the risks associated with a prostate operation whereas
women are not."99 Likewise, women are protected against the risks
associated with breast cancer whereas men are not.
In what sense was the fact that pregnancy was a female-
dominant "additional" risk distinguishable from the fact that a hair
transplant was a male-dominant "additional" risk? If there was a
legally cognizable difference, then the majority might have been
correct in concluding that G.E.'s plan provided equal coverage. It
has been shown that the majority's bifurcation of pregnant and
nonpregnant women with respect to coverage was invalid when used
to explain lack of per se discrimination.100 It was also demonstrated
that the majority's nondisease-voluntariness criteria were incompe-
tent to explain lack of discriminatory motive. 10 1 Was their isolation
of pregnancy as an additional risk strike three? The resolution of
this question lies in the ascertainment of the meaning of equality of
coverage, for the G.E. plan, with the pregnancy exclusion, was said
to provide equal coverage between men and women in such a way
that pregnancy-related disabilities, if covered, would have rendered
the plan's coverage unequal.
Actually, there were two different conceptions of equality
involved in the Gilbert decision, one upon which the majority
implicitly relied, the other upon which Justices Brennan and
Stevens, in their separate dissents, explicitly relied. The majority's
conception of equality necessitated, in a logical sense, the pregnancy
exclusion. 0 2 In stark contrast, the conception of equality adopted by
Justices Brennan and Stevens logically necessitated the inclusion of
pregnancy-related disabilities. The Gilbert effect analysis, on the
coverage level, reduced to a game of definitions once again. 0 3
99. 97 S. Ct. at 421 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, in his dissent,
attempted in yet another manner to expose tle dearth of logic in the majority's
analysis:
Had General Electric assembled a catalogue of all ailments that befall
humanity, and then systematically proceeded to exclude from coverage
every disability that ... predominantly inflicts women, the Court could
still reason ... that the plan operates equally: Women, like men, would
be entitled to draw disability payments for their circumcisions and
prostatectomies, and neither sex could claim payment for pregnancies,
breast cancer, and all the other excluded female-dominated disabilities.
Id. at 416 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
101. See text accompanying notes 67-80 supra.
102. The pregnancy exclusion was necessitated in a logical sense because the entire
analysis was definitional. Definitional analysis alone does not incorporate the
teachings of experience. Experience, that is, the social impact of the pregnancy
exclusion on women in the work force, is more attuned to the intended meaning
of discriminatory effect. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971) (testing for employment, although facially neutral, had the effect of
excluding blacks; discriminatory effect found under Title VII).
103. A definitional game was also at work in the majority's analysis of per se
discrimination, where the majority defined a distinction between pregnant
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Under the majority's conception of equality, there is equality of
coverage if, outside of the unisex disability category, biologically
functionally analogous disabilities are covered. 10 4 Thus, when each
male-dominated disability covered is matched with a functionally
analogous female-dominated, counterpart which is covered, the
resulting coverage, is, equal. For example, the G.E. plan covered
vasectomies and salpingectomies,105 prostate -cancer and cervical
cancer. The plan did not cover pregnancy-related disabilities because
there was no functionally analogous male-dominated disability to
match. There was therefore no requirement that pregnancy-related
disabilities be included just because women possessed a heavier
burden in "'the scheme of human existence.' "106 Need, therefore,
was not the criterion for equality; quid pro quo served as the maxim
of equality. Equality between the sexes logically necessitated the
pregnancy exclusion, for pregnancy inclusion would tip previously
balanced coverage in favor of women, rendering the plan unequal.
Pregnancy, in this sense, was an additional risk.
Under the conception of coverage equality envisioned by
Justices Brennan and Stevens, if all of the disability risks associated
with one sex are covered, all of the disability risks associated with
the other sex must be covered. If all potential male-dominated
disability risks are protected, then all female-:dominated disability
risks should be protected. Equality of. coverage proceeds from the
maxim, To each, according to need.10 7 Justice Stevens had this idea
in view when he observed, "If the word ['risk'] is used ... to describe
the risk of uncompensated employment caused by physical disabil-
ity, men receive total protection . . . against that risk whereas
women receive only partial protection."1 0 8 Coverage must be equally
women and nonpregnant women as to future risk of pregnancy. See notes 40-45
supra. That very same game established a foothold in the majority's defining
"disease" in such a restrictive manner as to exclude pregnancy from the
definition and, thus, from any possible legal requirement of coverage in G.E.'s
plan. See notes 62-66 supra.
104. The functional analogy approach is rather artificial. For example, what in the
female is functionally analogous to disability from hair transplantation in the
male - female hormones to diminish hair? One way to avoid this type of
problem is to supplement the functional analogy approach with a trade-off
approach. There could be certain trade-off disabilities where a male-dominated
disability has no functional counterpart in.a female-dominated disability and
visa versa. The trade-off criteria should involve a consideration of the relative
seriousness of both disabilities and the average work absences occasioned
thereby.
105. Both are sterilizing procedures.
106. 97 S. Ct. at 409-410 n.17.
107. The British philosopher and social scientist, R. H. Tawney, argued that "the
more anxiously a society endeavours to secure equalityof consideration for all its
members, the greater will be the differentiation of treatment which, when once
the common human needs have been met,, it accords to the special needs of
different groups and individuals among them." R.H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 39
(1952); see generally BHAGAVAD GITA (Hindu religious text); K. MARX & F.
ENGEL.s, DAS KAPITAL; PLATO, REPUBLIC.
108. 97 S. Ct. at 421 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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appropriate to the needs of men and women in order to be equal
between them. Therefore, equality between the sexes logically
necessitated the inclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities.
The Gilbert majority, had they explicitly adopted the quid pro
quo conception of equality, could not find justification for their effect
analysis merely by stating that six out of nine justices believed in
the appropriateness of that conception, as if a mere definitional
analysis would suffice. The inquiry should have revolved around the
reasons why one definition of equality, rather than the other, was
more appropriate to the purposes of Title VII's ban on sex
discrimination. This inquiry was attempted by Justice Brennan in
his dissent. Justice Brennan arrived at the same conception of
coverage equality as did Justice Stevens, but by a route more
sociological than definitional. He argued that, because discrimina-
tion "is a social phenomenon encased in a social context," 10 9 its
meaning should be derived from "the desired end-products of [Title
VII]." 11 The ultimate objective of Title VII was "'to assure equality
of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory
practices and devices which have fostered [sexually] stratified job
environments to the disadvantage of [women].' "1 Equal treatment
in wages, seniority, pension benefits, and disability benefits was
among the means conceived by Congress to achieve equal employ-
ment opportunity for women.11 2 Justice Brennan encapsulated the
intimate relationship between income maintenance plan coverage
and the equal employment opportunities of women: "[Plregnancy
exclusions built into disability programs both financially burden
women workers and act to break down the continuity of the
employment relationship, thereby exacerbating women's compara-
tively transient role in the labor force." 11 3
Both governmental and private reports depict the increasing
need of women in today's labor market for income protection from
pregnancy-related disabilities.1 14 With the passage of time there has
been an ever-increasing proportion of women in the full-time work
force. 115 Two-thirds of all working women work out of necessity,
109. Id. at 419 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 420 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
112. This is clear from the wording of Title VII itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
113. 97 S. Ct. at 419.
114. Weyand, Baring the Cost of Bearing, 11 TRIAL 86 (May-June 1975) (attorney for
Gilbert, et al.); Binder, Pregnancy, Maternity Leave and Title VII, 1 OHIO No. U.
L. REV. 31 (1973); Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court - 1971-
1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 617, 682-83 (1974); Koontz, Childbirth and Childrearing
Leave: Job-Related Benefits, 17 N.Y.L.F. 480 (1971); Comment, Geduldig v.
Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 441, 456-61 (1975); Comment, Waiting for the Other Shoe -
Wetzel and Gilbert in the Supreme Court, 25 EMORY L.J. 125, 151-59 (1976); cf.
Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE L.J. 671, 720-22.
115. There are approximately 35 million women in the labor force. Weyand, Baring
the Cost of Bearing, 11 TRIAL 86, 87 (May-June 1975).
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either because they head their households or because they must
share household expenses with husbands who are unable alone to
provide adequate support.116 In addition, one-half of the states,
including Maryland, do not pay unemployment or disability
insurance for periods of disability caused by pregnancy."17 Thus, as
one commentator aptly described:
If [female employees] are physically unable to work because
of . . .pregnancy, they are disqualified for regular unem-
ployment benefits because their disability renders them not
"able and available" for work. In addition, under the
employment disability laws, illness due to pregnancy is not
covered, so the unemployed pregnant woman is denied
benefits from either form of compensation."
8
The Gilbert majority observed that a woman seeking to purchase
private disability insurance from an insurance company "would
have to pay an incremental amount over her male counterpart due
solely to the possibility of pregnancy-related disabilities."'"19 Finally,
unpaid absence from work caused by pregnancy disadvantages a
woman's seniority and pension status, disrupting her promotion and
pay raise achievement, and thereby tends to perpetuate a labor
market in which full-time female employees earn wages approxi-
mately sixty percent that of male employees. 120
In order to attain Title VII's goal of sexual parity in employment
opportunities, Justice Brennan argued, the Court should give "due
consideration to the uniqueness of 'disadvantaged' individuals."'12'
Women have certainly been treated in the employment arena to their
competitive disadvantage. Their uniqueness, like male uniqueness,
includes, in the sphere of disability income plans, unique needs.
Most women possess the need for pregnancy risk coverage. In the
opinion of Justices Brennan and Stevens, a plan not covering the
most significant female disability need - pregnancy - which, at the
same time, protects all possible male disability needs discriminates
against women. Coverage in such a case is not equally appropriate
to the needs of men and women, and thus tends to place women at a
116. Comment, 25 EMORY L.J. 125, note 113 supra, at 151.
117. This is the state of the law in Maryland. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, §§ 4(c), 6(f)
(Supp. 1976). Section 6(f) disqualifies any individual for benefits for, among other
things:
... any period of disability as a result of pregnancy during which period
she is physically unable to continue her employment. However, she shall
be eligible for benefits during pregnancy providing that she is physically
able to continue her employment, as properly certified by her physician,
and is otherwise eligible under the benefit of eligibility conditions set out
in § 4(c).
118. Walker, Sex Discrimination in Government Benefit Programs, 23 HAST. L.J. 277,
285 (1971).
119. 97 S. Ct. at 409-10 n.17.
120. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 501 n.5 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121. 97 S. Ct. at 419 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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competitive disadvantage in the labor market. In order to provide
equal coverage and avoid the invidious effects of opportunity
deprivation, G.E.'s plan would have to treat pregnancy-related
disabilities "on the same terms and conditions as ... other
temporary disabilities.'
1 22
Justice Brennan found precedential support for his sociological-
legal analysis in a similar approach taken in the Court's unanimous
1974 opinion in Lau v. Nichols,121 which involved another section of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.124 In the San Francisco public school
system, Chinese-American students lagged far behind natural
English-speaking students in English language fluency. Contribut-
ing to this differential was inadequate supplemental instruction in
English for the former. Although public funds were applied equally
to all students, the Court noted that "the Chinese-speaking
[students] receive fewer benefits than the English-speaking [stu-
dents] from [San Francisco's] school system which denies them a
meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational pro-
gram." 125 Although there was no discriminatory motive behind this
inadequate supplemental instruction, there was a discriminatory
impact upon Chinese-American students. The Court required
affirmative action English language instruction for Chinese-
speaking students of an intensity over and above that provided for
the English-speaking majority. The Court's order required, in actual
practice, the allocation of more money per Chinese-speaking student
than per natural English-speaking student. By requiring instruction
equally appropriate to the needs of both groups, an equal educa-
tional opportunity was to that extent insured. 1
26
Although the Gilbert majority did not explicitly go beyond their
definitional effect analysis, it is highly probable that their decision
turned primarily upon an unwillingness to impose upon employers
the potentially high costs of pregnancy disability benefits. 27
Although it is technically proper in a Title VII case to consider
employer costs only after discriminatory effect has been proven, in
which case an employer's only relevant defense is business
necessity, 28 the Gilbert majority dealt with employer costs in the
122. This language is used in the EEOC's pregnancy guideline, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b).
123. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
124. Lau involved section 601 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bans discrimination
based "on the ground of race, color, or national origin," in "any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
125. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (emphasis added).
126. Id.
127. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 492-96 (1974). Comment, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
441, note 113 supra, at 476-81; Comment, 25 EMORY L.J. 125, note 113 supra, at
151-59.
128. See note 57 supra, and accompanying text.
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beginning of its opinion 2 9 and spent over one-half of its time during
Argument 130 and Reargument' 3' on that topic.
G.E. argued that the goal of its plan was the "'appropriate
allocation of the benefit do "ar.' 132 It seemed appropriate, the
company explained, to do what was best for the largest number of
employees. 133 With limited income maintenance funds with which to
protect employees, G.E. had to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of increasing the burden on the benefit resources
which would result from the inclusion of pregnancy-related disabili-
ties. G.E. found that most of its employees were married and had
families and that most of these families were supported financially
by men rather than women. The company concluded that most
female employees were primarily supported by husbands and that
women denied pregnancy disability benefits would not suffer
significantly because their husbands would support them during the
disability period.
134
G.E. argued that the cost of providing pregnancy disability
benefits would be prohibitive. The Gilbert majority relied upon
statistics that had been used in the district court which indicated
that female G.E. employees as a class received a 170 percent higher
proportion of disability benefits -than the class of male G.E.
employees. 135 G.E. estimated, that- the inclusion of pregnancy
benefits would increa e this disparity to 210-230 percent for six
weeks of coverage and 300-330 percent for the average thirteen weeks
of pregnancy absence which G.E. had experienced. 136 Because G.E.'s
contributions per female employee were at least that contributed per
male employee, the company argued that the Equal Pay Act, 37 a
section of which is incorporated into the Bennett Amendment of
Title VII, 38 and the legislative intent of which has been interpreted
by the Wage and Hour Administrator to permit either equal
employer contributions or equal employee benefits between men and
129. 97 S. Ct. at 405-6.
130. 44 U.S.L.W. 3423 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1976).
131. 45 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1976).
132. Id. at 3297.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 97 S. Ct. at 405 n.9, 406 n.10.
136. This information was included in the district court's opinion, 375 F. Supp. at 378.
But see 45 U.S.L.W. at 3296, where G.E.'s attorney stated that the 300-330
percent estimate was for a full, twenty-six week disability period.
137. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976). The Equal Pay Act permits pay differentials between men
and women only when justified by (1) a seniority system, (2) a merit system, (3) a
system in which earnings are work. quantity or work quality dependent, or (4) a
system based upon a factor other, than sex. Id. § 206(d).
138. It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter
for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the
wages or compensation paid to or to be paid to employees of such
employer if such differentiation is authorized by section 206(d) of [the
Equal Pay Act].
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (emphasis added).
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women, 139 permitted the pregnancy exclusion. The Gilbert majority
accepted this argument only in so far as it dampened the persuasive
power of the EEOC's 1972 pregnancy guideline: "[G.E.'s] exclusion
of benefits for pregnancy disability would be declared an unlawful
employment practice under [that section of Title VII to which the
EEOC pregnancy guideline applies], but would be declared not to be
an unlawful employment practice under [that section of Title VII to
which the Wage and Hour Administrator's guideline applies]."'
40
Moreover, G.E. complained that forty percent of the females who
left G.E. due to pregnancy did not return to work at all, as contrasted
with a ninety percent return rate for other disabilities. 141 The
company argued that the inclusion of pregnancy as a covered
disability would constitute a form of severence pay for those women
who do not return, a type of compensation which G.E. does not pay
to anyone for any reason.142 Finally, if the corporation attempted to
cover pregnancy and, at the same time, keep costs at or near their
present level by reducing the amount of other benefits, limiting the
number of weeks for which other benefits are paid, or deleting
coverage of respiratory ailments caused by smoking, it would surely
meet swift and powerful resistance from the employees' labor union,
for "'[in the real world out there you just don't take it away.' "143 In
short, the majority in Gilbert seemed to hold, on a nondefinitional
plane, that, all cost factors considered, there was no discriminatory
effect upon female employees from G.E.'s pregnancy exclusion.
The separate dissenting opinions of Justices Brennan and
Stevens did not discuss G.E.'s costs. 44 Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Stevens would probably concur, however, in the following
statement of one commentator:
On the one hand, it might be assumed that [Title VII's]
purpose was merely to insure that henceforth sex discrimi-
nation in employment would be rational and reasonable.
Such an interpretation, however, supposes that Congress,
lacking confidence in the free play of the market, desired
only to deal with irrational and purposeless discrimination,
139. 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1975), quoted in 97 S. Ct. at 412.
140. Id.
141. 44 U.S.L.W. at 3423. This figure was also included in the district court's opinion,
375 F. Supp. at 378. But see Comment, 25 EMORY L.J. 125, note 113 supra, at 157:
Indications are that the likelihood of return after delivery will be greater
in the future as barriers to women's full participation in the work force
continue to be eliminated. Increased job security for women should foster
a feeling of continuity with and loyalty to their employment. The
provision of maternity coverage should operate to-promote the employ-
er's interest in maintaining an experienced work force.
142. 375 F. Supp. at 379; 44 U.S.L.W. at 3423.
143. 45 U.S.L.W. at 3299 (argument of G.E.'s attorney).
144. Justice Brennan's dissent did point out that the federal government, as an
employer, follows a pregnancy-inclusive rule. 97 S. Ct. at 419.
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and that the primary objective of the ban was to proscribe
employment practices based upon the irrational prejudices
of employers. The alternative . . . [is that] Congress, in an
attempt to provide greater female employment opportunity,




Whether or not one agrees with the Gilbert decision, the fact
remains that it stands as authoritative federal law with regard to
Title VII. It is now the task of Congress and the state legislatures to
relegate Gilbert to the realm of mere history, a status akin to that
which cases such as Dred Scottl 46 and Plessy147 possess. An attempt
to do just that is presently underway in Congress 148 and in the
states, including Maryland, which recently enacted legislation
requiring employers and insurance companies to treat pregnancy-
related disabilities like other temporary disabilities in employer
plans and insurance contracts. 149
Equality of opportunity is a precious value in the United States.
It is a value hailed in America as far back in our history as the
founding of the Republic itself. 150 Philosophers, from Plato151 to
John Rawls, 152 have considered it essential to a strong nation. Its
achievement, however, has always entailed economic costs. Consider
the American quest to insure blacks an equal opportunity in
education and employment. America receives in return for those
145. Comment, 1968 DUKE L.J. 671, note 113 supra, at 723.
146. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that black slaves were not
included under the word "citizens" in the Constitution; runaway slave was
property of his owner).
147. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana statute requiring
equal but separate accommodations for whites and blacks in railroad passenger
cars).
148. See S. 995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701 (1977). This bill attempts to amend § 701 of
Title VII.
149. The new legislation amends MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19A (minimum six weeks
coverage by employers) and MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 470K, 477N (insurance).
150. There is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue
and talents. . . . There is, also, an artificial aristocracy, founded on
wealth and birth without either virtue or talents: for with these it would
belong to the first class. The natural aristocracy I consider as the most
precious gift of nature for the instruction, the trusts, and government of
society.
1 THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA 48 (J. Foley, ed. 1967).
151. PLATO, REPUBLIC 144-55 (F.M. Cornford, 3d ed. 1972). Although Plato considered
women the weaker of the two sexes, id. at 153, he added, speaking through
Socrates, that "there is no occupation concerned with the management of social
affairs which belongs either to woman or to man, as such. Natural gifts are to be
found here and there in both creatures alike; and every occupation is open to
both, so far as their natures are concerned." Id.
1.52. "[Tjhose with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances.... In
all sectors of society there should be roughly equal prospects of culture and
achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed." J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 73 (1971).
19771 335
Baltimore Law Review
costs something of great value - social unity153 and the addition of
the multifarious talents of those who otherwise might never
contribute to society and to themselves.
Considering this treasured value's expression in philosophy,
political science, and Title VII, is it justifiable that a biological
function - childbearing - a function activated equally by men and
women and unavoidable if the human race is to survive, be made a
major basis for the perpetuation of sexual inequality in the United
States? Are the qualifications for attaining the American dream -
that women forego childbearing while employed - fair and just? Not
giving due consideration to the special needs of women in Gilbert
was, in actuality, giving due consideration only to the special needs
of the dominant sex - men - thus solidifying the present state of
inequality. The move toward sexual equality requires some confor-
mity by women to the rigorous requirements of the male-dominated
working world. At the same time, the male-dominated economy must
incorporate some of the special needs of women in order to insure
that women will have an equal chance, assuming equivalent talent
and motivation, to find success in the American life-world. The
realization of that goal is necessary if women are to take their
rightful, equal place with men in a society of persons, for "[tjhe
pedestal upon which women have been placed has all too often, upon
closer inspection, been revealed as a cage."
15 4
Donn Weinberg
153. Social unity is more discernable a result in the long run rather than in the short
run, as the daily heated disputes over busing to achieve racial integration
demonstrate the short run resistence to change in social arrangements.
154. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20, 485 P.2d 529, 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 341
(1971).
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